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The 1983 session of the Nebraska Unicameral enacted a statu-
tory overhaul of the service of process statutes that comprehen-
sively modernized this area of civil procedure.' The sometimes
ambiguous patchwork of sections built up over the past century
was replaced with a single statute that establishes a consistent ap-
proach and permits the Nebraska courts to exercise fully the judi-
cial power of the state. The new statute will be of primary interest
and importance to Nebraska judges and lawyers, but the legisla-
tive policy choices reflected by the new statute will also be of inter-
est to other jurisdictions. Therefore, this Article will discuss the
important provisions of the statute and explain the policy choices
and theoretical structure that established the form of the statute.
A legislature does not have complete freedom to select proce-
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska; Reporter for Nebraska Supreme
Court Committee on Practice and Procedure. The service of process statute
was prepared by the committee, but this article reflects only the views of the
author.
1. LB. 447, 88th Leg., 1st Sess., (1983).
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dures for service of process. The permissible policy choices are
constrained in two ways by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution.2 One due
process test is concerned with notice-any state statute must pro-
vide sufficient procedures for notifying a defendant of the suit in
order to give the defendant an opportunity to contest the merits.3
The other due process test is concerned with power-a state court
cannot assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless the de-
fendant has a sufficient connection with the forum.4 Of course the
due process clause only establishes outer boundaries on what the
legislature may do, leaving the legislature free to provide for more
than the minimum notice or to assert less than all the permitted
judicial power.
The original impetus for the new Nebraska statute was the
United States Supreme Court opinion in Greene v. Lindsey.5
Greene created doubt about the constitutionality of the century-
old Nebraska statute that had permitted substituted service of pro-
cess by leaving the summons at the residence of the defendant.6
The new statute goes beyond the narrow repair of the substituted
service section to make all service of process as effective and least
costly as possible. The new statute also provides for service by
certified mail, eliminates many obsolete requirements for service
by publication, reduces the previous wide variety in methods of
service, and gives the trial judge more power to fashion specific
alternative service methods if normal service is ineffective. Part I
of this Article will review the methods of service, including a dis-
cussion of Greene, an examination of the due process limits on
substituted service, and a review of the Nebraska statute and the
policy choices made by the legislature.
The power test of the due process clause involves the familiar
issue of long arm jurisdiction and sufficient minimum contacts, an
area where the United States Supreme Court has been active dur-
ing the last few years. Nebraska statutes had been amended dur-
ing the last several decades in an effort to take advantage of the
expanding reach of state judicial power, but the statutes eventu-
ally became disorganized and duplicative. Even worse, it was not
clear whether the legislature had authorized the Nebraska courts
to exercise the full judicial power. The new Nebraska statute
clearly provides that the courts may assert personal jurisdiction to
the limits permitted by the due process clause; in addition, redun-
2. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971).
3. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
4. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
5. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
6. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-508 (1979).
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dant sections and the obsolete procedures such as service on a
statutory agent have been eliminated. Of course, judicial power
bounded only by the due process clause will be used effectively
only by keeping up with the ongoing development of the theory of
long arm jurisdiction. Part II of this Article will examine modern
long arm doctrine and consider what can be accomplished with the
new Nebraska statute.
Part I of this Article will examine several topics of Nebraska
procedure that were affected by this statute. The statute finally
presents a clear answer to the persistent problem of how a party
can challenge personal jurisdiction with a special appearance and
whether and how a special appearance overruled at the trial level
can be preserved for appeal after a trial on the merits. The statute
also makes it easier to serve process on some typical defendants,
such as the State of Nebraska in original actions and administra-
tive appeals, although the limited scope of this statute means that
not all procedural problems of administrative appeals were re-
solved. Each of these topics will be discussed, in order to facilitate
a better understanding of the new statute and effective use of the
improved procedures for service of process.
L METHODS OF SERVICE OF PROCESS: NOTICE
A. Greene v. Lindsey
The most direct and certain method of serving a summons is by
personally delivering it to the defendant and telling the defendant
that it is a summons. Many American jurisdictions also permit
residence service as a substitute for actual service, either by leav-
ing the summons at the defendant's residence or by leaving it
there with someone. Residence service has a practical advantage,
because it permits the sheriff to make effective service even
though the defendant is not present. It also eliminates much of the
incentive to hide from the sheriff to avoid service. Until 1983, Ne-
braska law permitted such substituted service by leaving the sum-
mons at the "usual place of residence," a provision that had always
been a part of Nebraska law.7
When a court enters a default judgment because the defendant
has not answered, there is always the chance the defendant was
never notified of the lawsuit. Even requiring actual delivery of the
summons to the defendant is not foolproof, as the sheriff may erro-
neously serve the wrong person, but substituted service by leaving
7. Id. See Code of Civ. P. § 69, REV. STAT. OF TERR. OF NEB. (1866). Residence
service was permitted under both English common law and equity practice.
R. MuiLR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TlftAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
89-90 (1952).
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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
it at the residence increases the risk of error if the name or address
is incorrect or if the summons disappears before the defendant
sees it. Prior to 1982, each state could either decide that the added
risk of nonreceipt by the defendant was acceptable, given the ben-
efits, or reduce the risk by requiring some additional step to com-
plete the service such as leaving it at the residence with someone
or leaving it at the residence and thereafter mailing a copy of the
summons to the defendant. The state's choice was a policy matter
not constrained by the due process clause, until the decision in
Greene v. Lindsey.8
The plaintiffs in Greene were challenging a Kentucky statute
that permitted substituted service of process in a forcible entry
and detainer action by posting the summons on the door of the
residence if the process server was unable to make either personal
service or substituted service by leaving the summons with a fam-
ily member over sixteen. The plaintiffs claimed they never re-
ceived a summons posted on their apartment door and that they
did not learn of the eviction proceedings until the writ of posses-
sion, based on a default judgment, was executed, at a time when it
was too late to appeal and apparently too late to reopen the de-
fault. The plaintiffs presented testimony by some process servers
that posted summons were "not infrequently removed" by persons
other than those served.9 Since that testimony was undisputed, it
appeared to form the basis for a factual finding that the posted no-
tice was constitutionally inadequate uhder the due process clause.
A narrow reading of Greene would limit the opinion to the par-
ticular facts of the case, but the Supreme Court may have intended
a broader effect. The procedural stance of Greene suggests that
the Supreme Court intended to hold that residence service alone
would always be inadequate as a routine method of serving pro-
cess. Greene was filed as a class action for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against the Louisville
housing authority and several public housing officials, as well as
the county sheriff and sheriff's deputies. The district court granted
a summary judgment for all defendants, relying on a 1909 Sixth
Circuit opinion that had upheld notice by posting on the door.O
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit overruled the 1909 opinion, holding
that the plaintiffs' evidence established that "notice by posting 'is
not reasonably calculated to reach those who could be easily in-
formed by other means at hand,"' and that service by mail was
preferable, and then remanded for further proceedings." The
8. 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
9. Id. at 453.
10. Weber v. Grand Lodge of Kentucky, F. & A. M., 169 F. 522 (6th Cir. 1909).
11. Lindsey v. Greene, 649 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1981).
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Supreme Court did not endorse as strongly the use of mail as a
substitute for posting on the door, but otherwise affirmed the Sixth
Circuit judgment. The actual evidence submitted by plaintiff did
not receive prominent mention in the Supreme Court opinion, but
was employed more to illustrate the conclusion that posting alone
was insufficient. 12 There did not appear to be any evidence that
the summons served on the particular class action plaintiffs had
been actually removed, and no evidence that the process server
had any reason to suspect the particular summons would be re-
moved before it was seen by the person being served. Even
though Greene itself only involved a forcible entry and detainer
statute, the language of the opinion is not restricted to that kind of
case. In short, if the sheriff in Louisville is to be enjoined from
residence service by posting on the door in forcible entry and de-
tainer actions on the facts in Greene, the breadth of the opinion
requires that other states also cease to use such service.13
Although Greene makes it clear that residence service by post-
ing provides inadequate notice, the opinion is less clear regarding
permissible alternatives that will satisfy the due process clause.
The Sixth Circuit opinion implied that the alternative should be
first class mail,14 a position to which the dissenting Justices on the
Supreme Court reacted most strongly by arguing that no evidence
in the record established that first class mail is empirically more
likely to reach a defendant than posting.15 The Sixth Circuit opin-
ion also followed its statement about mailed notice with a refer-
ence to the New York practice, which requires that service by
posting be followed by sending a copy by registered or certified
mail.16 Justice Brennan's opinion first disclaimed any effort to es-
tablish an alternative, but did observe that "posted service accom-
panied by mail service is constitutionally preferable to posted
service alone."17 These alternatives, posting and mailing or mail-
ing instead of posting, do not exhaust the list of alternatives. An-
other widely used form of substituted service is leaving it at the
12. 456 U.S. at 455 n.9.
13. Justice O'Connor's dissent listed 11 states which permitted residence service
by posting alone. Id. at 458 n.1. Two other states have also amended their
statutes to provide for more effective substituted service. COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-40-112(2), (3) (1973) (amended by S. B. 80, May 26, 1983) (post and send
by first class mail in forcible entry and detainer actions); FLA. STAT. § 48.183
(1973) (amended by H. B. 498, May 19, 1983) (post and send by first class mail
after two unsuccessful attempts at personal service in actions for possession
of residential premises). See also State ex rel. Thomas v. Neal, 299 S.E.2d 23
(W. Va. 1982).
14. 649 F.2d at 428.
15. 456 U.S. at 456.
16. 649 F.2d at 428.
17. 456 U.S. at 455, n.9.
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defendant's residence with someone other than the defendant.18
For each method there is a different balance of risks and advan-
tages. The major risks created by permitting substituted service
are that the summons will be left at the wrong place, or it will be
left at the right place but will be removed before defendant gets it,
or it will not be delivered to the defendant by the person with
whom the sheriff left it. The major advantages of substituted serv-
ice are the efficiency gained if the sheriff can avoid the need to re-
turn if the the defendant is not home, and the ability to complete
effective service on at least some defendants who may be actively
trying to avoid the sheriff.
Service by first class mail alone, with no receipt, is an alterna-
tive method of substituted service, but it hardly seems likely to
comply with the due process clause, notwithstanding the Sixth
Circuit's possible endorsement of it in Greene .19 The Sixth Circuit
clearly had no empirical data to show that the rate of pilferage
from mailboxes in public housing projects was less than the rate of
removal of summons from doors. The chance that the summons
will be mailed or delivered to the wrong address must be at least as
high, if not higher, as the chance it will be posted on the wrong
door. With ordinary mail there is no sheriff's return of service to
provide some assurance that the summons was actually posted
and when it was posted; in entering a default, the court can rely
only on post office routine to deliver mail promptly and return un-
deliverable mail. Although the Supreme Court upheld the use of
first class mail service in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co.,20 it was in the context of an action more like class litigation
than individual litigation.2 1 Given these defects in service by ordi-
nary mail, the wise course is to consider the caveat in Greene as a
warning not to use ordinary mail as a routine method of substi-
tuted service.
Substituted service by posting at the residence and mailing a
copy by first class mail to the defendant increases the chance that
18. The Greene opinion had no reason to discuss residence service by leaving the
summons with someone. That method of service was the preferred alterna-
tive under the Kentucky statute but had not been used because no one was
home. Id. at 446.
19. 649 F.2d at 428. Other jurisdictions that permit service by first class mail re-
quire that the defendant sign and return an acknowledgement of service in
order to have effective service; the sanction for refusing to return the ac-
knowledgment is liability for costs of personal service. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv.
P. 4(c) (2) (C) (ii); CAL. CODE Crv. P. § 415.30.
20. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
21. In Mullane, the parties served by first class mail were trust beneficiaries; the
action was a judicial settlement of the account of a trustee of the common
trust fund. The Supreme Court held that notice would not have to reach all
beneficiaries because of the class nature of the litigation. 339 U.S. at 319.
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the defendant will receive the summons because it is more un-
likely that both the summons will be torn off the door and the
mailbox will be rifled. On the other hand, certain risks are not sig-
nificantly reduced, such as the possibility that the address is incor-
rect, the defendant is out of town for a few weeks, or someone is
actively trying to keep the defendant from learning of the suit. For
that reason, substituted service by leaving the summons with
someone at the defendant's residence is the preferable alternative
to reduce the risk that the defendant will not get timely notice of
the lawsuit.2 2 The sheriff will be more likely to learn of the wrong
address if required to find someone at the residence, and the per-
son with whom the summons is left may be able to tell an absent
defendant about the service. Not all risks are eliminated, and
more risks of nondelivery could be eliminated by combining the
methods to require that it be left with someone and mailed to the
defendant, but such overkill loses sight of the original goal of al-
lowing a reasonable method of substituted service.
Even requiring that substituted service be made by leaving it
with someone at defendant's residence can cause practical
problems in serving process, as there is no guarantee that a fellow
resident will be home if the defendant is not. A defendant at-
tempting to evade service can do so more easily by disappearing
when the sheriff appears or just not answering the door. These
were exactly the problems that were avoided by posting the sum-
mons on the door under the old law, but Greene v. Lindsey now
requires that the state strike a different balance that increases the
chance of actual notice to the defendant.
B. Service Under the New Nebraska Statute
1. Residence Service
The basic method of substituted service permitted under the
new Nebraska statute is "by leaving the summons at the usual
place of residence of the individual to be served, with some person
of suitable age and discretion residing therein."23 This method has
been labeled "residence service" in the new statute to clearly dis-
tinguish it from personal service; the later specific service sections
in the statute state whether both personal or residence service
may be used or if only personal service is permitted.24 Careful
consideration of the wording of the statute provides further gui-
22. This is the service method under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d) (1) and
in several states. See, e.g., ARiz. R. Crv. P. 4(d)(1); ME. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1);
MIN. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a).
23. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-505.01(2) (Supp. 1983).
24. For example, in an ordinary civil action an individual can be served by per-
sonal, residence, or certified mail service, but in a divorce action only per-
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dance. The requirement that the service be at the residence obvi-
ously eliminates service by leaving it at an office or place of
employment.25 The requirement that the summons be left with a
person of "suitable age and discretion" imposes primary responsi-
bility and discretion on the process server to judge the reliability
of the person given the summons. This is a reasonable require-
ment since the process is typically served by a sheriff or a deputy
sheriff, and not by a private process server. While some other ju-
risdictions have defined a specific minimum age,2 6 that approach is
unnecessarily arbitrary and capable of invalidating an otherwise
valid service. The requirement that the person handed the sum-
mons be "residing therein" means that the process server must
make some inquiry about the relationship of the person to the
residence. 27
The new form of residence service will mean that the summons
will not be served in some cases as quickly as was possible before,
or will not be served by the sheriff at all, even though it could have
been under prior law. On the other hand, the statute was not in-
tended to, and does not, provide a haven for the defendant at-
tempting to evade service, as it requires only that personal service
be made by "leaving the summons with the individual to be
served."28 The defendant does not need to accept the summons,
sign for the summons, acknowledge receipt of the summons, or
even touch the summons, to be properly served. The old concern
in some states with antiquated formality of service is not a part of
the Nebraska statute. Personal service will be proper if the de-
fendant is present, aware of the officer's presence and purpose,
and could have in-hand service "by the simple expedient of open-
ing the door in response to the officer's request."29
sonal service is permitted. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-508.01(1), 42-352 (Supp.
1983).
25. Prior law had also required such service only at the residence. § 25-508, NEB.
REv. STAT. (repealed 1983).
26. See, e.g., A!x. R. Crv. P. 4(d) (1) (at least 14); ILL. PRACTICE ACT § 13.2(1) (13
or upwards); IOWA R. Crv. P. 56.1(a) (at least 18); Mo. R. Crv. P. 54.13(a) (1)
(over 15).
27. The officer will also need to learn the name of the person with whom the
summons is left in order to complete the return. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-
507.01 (Supp. 1983).
28. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-505.01(1) (Supp. 1983).
29. Haney v. Olin Corp., 245 So. 2d 671, 674 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (When sheriff
identified himself, defendant ran into house and refused to open door; "[a] n
officer's reasonable attempt to effect personal service . . . cannot be frus-
trated by ... closing the front door ... and willfully refusing to accept serv-
ice of process, very much as a child playing a game of tag might gain
instantaneous immunity by calling 'King's X'." Id. at 673.) See also iber-
man v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 256 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (proper
personal service when process server left papers in mailbox after seeing de-
[Vol. 63:1
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2. Certified Mail Service
A major benefit of the new statute should be the provision for
routine use of certified mail service,3 0 a less expensive alternative
to personal service by the sheriff. Although service by mail was
available prior to 1983 in a few specific statutes,3 1 it has only now
been made available for ordinary civil actions at the election of the
plaintiff. Routine use of certified mail service should be en-
couraged in most cases, unless there is some reason to think that
the defendant will refuse to accept the mail. If the defendant does
refuse to accept it, the plaintiff can always have the sheriff attempt
service with a second summons. Even if it is close to the statute of
limitations, service by certified mail can still be used because
plaintiff has six months to complete service after commencement
of the action.32
Certified mail service may be either actual service on the de-
fendant or substituted service, as the statute does not require that
the defendant sign the receipt.33 If the defendant personally signs
the receipt, there will, of course, be actual service, but the lan-
guage of the statute also permits the receipt to be signed by some-
one else at the address. This increases the chance that the
summons will be delivered promptly, and should avoid the need
for some defendants to make an extra trip to the post office to
claim the certified mail. This substituted service provision is not
as restricted as for residence service, since certified mail does not
have to be sent only to defendant's residence. The certified mail
service may be made to an office, or even a post office box, and the
person signing the receipt does not have to reside at the address
either.
This form of substituted service by certified mail appears to sat-
isfy both the letter and the spirit of the Supreme Court's opinion in
fendant hiding in the house); Carlson v. Cohen, 302 Minn. 531, 223 N.W.2d 810
(1974) (proper personal service by placing summons and complaint under
windshield wiper of defendant's auto when defendant refused to accept pa-
pers); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Discount Co., 15 Wash. App. 559, 550 P.2d 699
(1976) (proper service "to leave papers at a place where they can be easily
retrieved, rather than to physically hand them to the defendant... after ob-
vious attempt to evade service by slamming the door after the papers had
been held out ... ." Id. at 561, 550 P.2d at 721).
30. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-501.01(3) (Supp. 1983).
31. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-524 (Supp. 1982) (small claims court); id. 25-540
(1979) (long arm jurisdiction); id. § 48-175 (1978) (Workmen's Compensation
Court).
32. Id. § 25-217 (1979).
33. There must be a "return receipt requested" and the "signed receipt" must be
fied. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-505.01(3) (Supp. 1983). This language was pur-
posely used to permit the receipt to be signed by someone other than the
defendant.
19831
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Greene.34 Certified mail is not just left in the mailbox unattended,
but is given the added attention that comes from having a signed
receipt. The receipt, showing to whom and where delivered, pro-
vides some record of delivery and a check on the accuracy of the
defendant's address. There is always the risk that even certified
mail will not be delivered correctly, but that risk appears to be rel-
atively slight and acceptable to achieve the goal of reducing the
cost of serving process and providing an effective substitute for the
old residence service.
3. Other Forms of Service
If the defendant cannot be served by one of the three primary
methods of service-personal service, residence service, or certi-
fied mail service-the new statute authorizes the court to order an
alternative method of service for the particular case.35 The failure
to serve with the primary methods must be shown by an affidavit
that "service cannot be made with reasonable diligence by any
other method provided by statute," and the record should typically
show that service was tried unsuccessfully. However, the statute
does not require that all methods be tried without success. Lack of
success is not what is critical, but rather the reason for the lack of
success. Therefore, the affidavit must demonstrate why reason-
able diligence has not been sufficient to accomplish effective ser-
vice. Avoiding the mail carrier or refusing the certified mail would
not show that the sheriff could not make personal service. Living
alone and not being home when the sheriff came to the house
would not show that the sheriff could not make personal service at
another time or place. In such cases, the alternative service would
not be proper.3 6 On the other hand, if the plaintiff has made a dili-
gent inquiry of defendant's family, friends, or co-workers and can-
not locate the defendant at all, or if the defendant appears to be
actively attempting to avoid the sheriff, then a court can properly
permit some alternative form of service.
The first possible alternative form of service listed in the statute
is "leaving the process at the defendant's usual place of residence
and mailing a copy by first-class mail to the defendant's last known
34. Similar language is used in Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 4.1(1). The
Supreme Court of Ohio has upheld such a provision. Samson Sales, Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 66 Ohio St. 2d 290, 421 N.E.2d 522 (1981) (certified mail ad-
dressed to corporation); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 64 Ohio St. 2d 49, 413 N.E.2d 1182
(1980) (certified mail receipt signed by another person at defendant's
address).
35. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-517.02 (Supp. 1983).
36. Plaintiff should instead provide the sheriff with better information about
where to make personal service, and have an alias summons issued, if
necessary.
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address ... .,,s3 This is necessary only if the sheriff cannot find
someone at the residence with whom to leave the summons for
residence service and the defendant did not claim or refused certi-
fied mail. It is possible only if the plaintiff can locate the defend-
ant's residence and last-known address. Therefore, this method is
primarily aimed at the defendant who is avoiding the sheriff in or-
der to prevent personal service of the summons, or the defendant
who keeps such a random schedule that no one can track him
down. This method, leaving it at the residence and mailing, was
mentioned favorably in Greene,38 and even though it may not be
the best method of substituted service, it is a good second best al-
ternative for certain defendants who have a known residence.
For defendants who have no known residence, leaving the pro-
cess at the residence and mailing it will not work, and the court
will have to provide some other method of service. Traditionally,
such defendants have been served by publication; the new statute
continues that possibility,39 but also permits the judge to custom-
ize a method of service that may be more reliable and less expen-
sive. Creative methods of serving process can be suggested by
parties and approved by the court, because the statutory test goes
no farther than stating the constitutional minimum that the serv-
ice be "reasonably calculated under the circumstances to provide
the party with actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity
to be heard."40 Since 'the circumstances" necessarily includes the
failure of the normal service methods to reach the defendant after
the plaintiff has employed reasonable diligence, an alternative
method of service might be authorized that would have violated
the due process clause if used in the first instance. For example,
service on an insured driver who has since disappeared and cannot
be found might be made on the insurance company which issued
the liability policy.4 1
One typical example of the need for alternative service on a de-
fendant with an unknown address is a divorce action. Prior to 1983,
the plaintiff had to either make personal service or proceed by
37. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-517.02(1) (Supp. 1983).
38. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444,455 n.9 (1982).
39. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-517.02(2) (Supp. 1983).
40. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-517.02(3) (Supp. 1983). The Court, in Greene, repeated
similar language from its earlier opinion in Mullane. Greene v. Lindsey, 456
U.S. 444, 449 (1982) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co,
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). Similar language is used in Michigan General Court
Rule 105.8.
41. See Krieger v. Williams, 410 Mich. 144, 300 N.W.2d 910 (1981); Feuchtbaum v.
Constantini 59 NJ. 167, 280 A.2d 161 (1971); Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d
490, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161, 236 N.E.2d 451 (1968).
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publication.42 Under the new statute, the summons must be
served either by personal service or under the provision authoriz-
ing alternative service, which no longer limits the alternatives to
publication.43 Other methods should be considered, since publica-
tion in a legal newspaper is expensive, and in many cases simply
wasteful given the exceedingly slight chance it will be seen.44 In
divorce actions, one court has approved an alternative of mailing to
a last known address and posting at three public places in the
county.45 Other methods, such as leaving a copy of the summons
and petition with a close relative and posting in a public place, or
even just posting it in two or three public places, should be ade-
quate notice to satisfy the due process requirement if diligent in-
quiry fails to find any useful mailing address or location.
Constructive service of a nonresident defendant to obtain long
arm jurisdiction has hopefully disappeared from practice. While
service in the state, by publication, was once the only way to pro-
ceed because the summons could not be sent across the state line,
modern long arm theory has eliminated that. Any defendant with
sufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction can be served
directly under the new long arm statute without the need for any
publication at all. That will leave service by publication for those
cases where it is elsewhere required, such as in probate cases, and
those cases where court and counsel cannot create an equally ef-
fective method of serving the unfound defendant. It has long been
accepted that service by publication alone is insufficient to satisfy
due process requirements if better notice can be given,46 and the
Nebraska statute, therefore, requires that notice by mail be sent in
addition to the publication, if the address is known.47 That, in ef-
fect, treats the publication as a very weak substitute for actual no-
tice and the mailed notice as the actual notice, so it would be
better to stop publishing altogether and focus on the best method
of providing actual notice.
Any method of constructive notice may fail occasionally to
reach a defendant in time to permit a defense on the merits. How-
42. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-355 (repealed 1983).
43. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-352 (Supp. 1983).
44. Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an ad-
vertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper,
and if he makes his home outside the area of the newspaper's normal
circulation the odds that the information will never reach him are
large indeed.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
45. Dungan v. Dungan, 579 S.W.2d 183 (Tenn. 1979) (alternative notice in lieu of
publication for divorce petitioners proceeding in forma pauperis).
46. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchin-
son, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
47. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-520.01 (1979).
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ever, if the procedure is proper, due process is satisfied and a re-
sulting judgment is not open to attack for denial of due process,
even if defendant had no actual notice.48 If a default is entered
because a proper method still does not reach the defendant, the
defendant's recourse is to reopen the default, by demonstrating
sufficient grounds to vacate the judgment.49
II. LONG ARM JURISDICTION: POWER
A. The Test of Minimum Contacts
The most significant change in the law governing service of pro-
cess during the last century has been the ability to serve a sum-
mons outside the state, under what is called long arm jurisdiction.
The theory of long arm jurisdiction developed slowly over decades,
and during that period of slow development, Nebraska adopted
several long arm statutes of varying reach.5 0 The 1983 statute re-
pealed the older and now obsolete long arm statutes and amended
the general long arm statute to remove previously existing ambigu-
ity and clearly show that the legislature intends the Nebraska
courts to exercise long arm jurisdiction to the fullest extent possi-
ble, limited only by the due process clause.
Certain nonresident defendants are clearly subject to personal
jurisdiction when sued in a Nebraska court. For example, the non-
resident motorist who causes an accident in Nebraska and the
nonresident manufacturer who markets a defective product in Ne-
braska can both be served with a summons from a Nebraska court.
Such cases fall well within the limits of the judicial power of the
state under the long arm doctrine. What is more difficult to predict
is the outer reach of the state's jurisdiction, for two reasons. First,
long arm jurisdiction has grown, so that the outer limits keep ex-
panding. Second, current United States Supreme Court doctrine is
unclear, and unstable; the doctrine is likely to change, but the di-
rection of change is hard to predict. Therefore, the history and cur-
rent doctrine of long arm jurisdiction will be reviewed briefly,
because both history and current doctrine are necessary to under-
stand what may happen in the next few years.5 1
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 25 Comment e (1971).
49. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2001(7) (1979). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 67 (1982).
50. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-20,114 (1977); 25-530 (1979); 25-530.02 (1979); 44-
137.02 (1978).
51. This article will not present a full discussion of long arm jurisdiction because
that topic has been more than adequately discussed elsewhere. Among some
of the better recent articles are Braveman, Interstate Federalism and Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, 33 SYRACUSE I REV. 533 (1982); Clermont, Restating Terri-
torial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CONELL L.
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The basic principles of long arm jurisdiction, and the historical
development of long arm theory, should be familiar. The United
States Supreme Court, in 1877, in Pennoyer v. Neff,52 held that pro-
cess could not be sent to a defendant outside the borders of the
issuing jurisdiction, because it would infringe the sovereignty of
the defendant's state if the defendant could be forced to leave and
go to the issuing state to defend the suit. The Court also held that
it would be a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment for any state to enter a judgment against a defendant
without some form of valid, in-state service of process. In the next
century, the realities of interstate travel and trade led the Court to
retreat from Pennoyer and to permit some alternative methods of
service of process that effectively allowed the summons to reach
outside the state where it was issued.
The landmark opinion that established the modern rules for
long arm jurisdiction was International Shoe Co. v. Washington5 3
in 1945. In International Shoe, the Court held that a nonresident
defendant could be served outside the state, if the defendant had
sufficient contacts with the state to meet the tests of due process.
After International Shoe, the major question was how few contacts
is enough, or how minimal can the contacts be and still meet the
minimum contacts test.
In Hanson v. Denckla,54 the Court established some general
rules of long arm jurisdiction; and more importantly, in the debate
between the majority and dissenters, outlined a basic dispute. The
facts of Hanson were unique and not important; the doctrinal dis-
pute still continues. The majority, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Warren, held that a state could not exercise long arm jurisdiction
over an absent defendant unless there was "some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws."55 Thus, the majority opinion justified the
exercise of long arm jurisdiction on a quid pro quo theory, so that a
defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction only if the
REV. 411 (1981); Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81
CoLum. L. REV. 960 (1981); Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and
the Curse ofAbstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 No-
TRE DAmE L. REV. 699 (1983); Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien De-
fendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85 (1983); McDougal, Judicial Jurisdiction" From a
Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1982); Redish, Due Pro-
cess, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75
Nw. U.L. REV. 1112 (1981).
52. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
53. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
54. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
55. Id. at 253.
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defendant first got something from the state, and got it purpose-
fully. The opinion did not fully explain why the test should be so
focused on the defendant's contact with the forum. The dissenting
opinion by Justice Black, joined by Justices Burton and Brennan,
employed an entirely different test:
Where a transaction has as much relationship to a State as [in this case,I
its courts ought to have power to adjudicate controversies arising out of
that transaction, unless litigation there would impose such a heavy and
disproportionate burden on a nonresident defendant that it would offend
what this Court has referred to as "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice."56
Justice Black emphasized the transaction; since the defendant had
willingly participated in a transaction that involved some activity
in the forum state, there should be jurisdiction in the forum state
even if the defendant's own participation did not directly involve
the forum state.
The Hanson majority and Justice Black also disagreed about
the best approach to guard against the danger that litigation in an-
other forum would be unfairly burdensome. Implicit in the major-
ity quid pro quo test is some notion of fairness; that it would be
unfair to allow the "unilateral activity" of another to force a de-
fendant to be willing to defend in another forum. The majority as-
sumed that some defendants would be burdened or prejudiced if
required to defend in another state with which they had no direct
contact, and therefore established a narrower test for personal ju-
risdiction. Justice Black's broader test would increase the risk of
burdensome litigation in a distant forum, but would allow a de-
fendant who could show an actual burden to defeat jurisdiction.
Thus, Hanson established a defendant-oriented, one-step test
while Justice Black argued for a transaction-oriented, two-step
test.
For two decades after Hanson, the Supreme Court was silent on
long arm jurisdiction, leaving application or adaptation of the Han-
son test to the state supreme courts and the federal circuit courts.
In form, the Hanson test was applied, but in the result the test was
adapted to support long arm jurisdiction in an ever-increasing
number of areas, and with a shrinking number of minimum con-
tacts. For example, in product liability litigation, the Illinois
Supreme Court quickly showed how a state could assert all the
long arm jurisdiction necessary to reach an out-of-state manufac-
turer.5 7 The Gray opinion's language followed the Hanson test of
56. Id. at 258.
57. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 IM. 2d 432, 176
N.W.2d 761 (1961). In Gray, the defective product had been manufactured in
Ohio, incorporated into another product in Pennsylvania; it somehow got to
Illinois where it injured the plaintiff. There was no evidence in the record to
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purposeful affiliation, but the result more easily fits the minority
argument of Justice Black.
The United States Supreme Court finally returned to the long
arm cases in the late 1970's. After establishing in Shaffer v. Heit-
ner,58 in 1977, that all personal jurisdiction had to meet the mini-
mum contacts test of International Shoe, the Court finally
addressed some of the key issues of long arm jurisdiction in World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, in 1980.59 The facts of World-
Wide Volkswagen were those of a typical product liability action.
Plaintiffs bought an Audi in New York from a New York retailer.
The car had been manufactured in Germany by Audi, imported to
the United States by Volkswagen, and distributed to the retailer
through a regional distributor responsible for New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut. The Audi was struck from the rear in
Oklahoma, causing a fire which severely burned the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs sued in Oklahoma, joining as defendants Audi, Volk-
swagen, the regional distributor, and the retailer. Audi and Volk-
swagen conceded that they were subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the Oklahoma courts. The regional distributor and
retailer objected to personal jurisdiction. The objection was un-
successful in the trial court and Oklahoma Supreme Court,60 but
finally successful in the United States Supreme Court.
Justice White's opinion in World- Wide Volkswagen clearly fol-
lowed the Hanson rule that a defendant can be subjected to per-
sonal jurisdiction by the forum only if it "purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State."6 1
Plaintiffs had argued that the distributor and retailer were within
that test because it was foreseeable that a mobile product, such as
the Audi, might cause injury outside New York where it had been
sold. Justice White distinguished between foreseeability in the
sense of likelihood or possibility and foreseeability as a result of
the efforts of the defendant to directly or indirectly enter the mar-
ket of a particular state. Since the two local parties had not at-
tempted to enter the Oklahoma market, they did not have
minimum contacts with the forum, and the "unilateral activity" of
the buyer in driving to Oklahoma was not enough to create per-
sonal jurisdiction.
The three dissenting judges in World-Wide Volkswagen show
show that the Ohio defendant had done any business in Illinois. The Illinois
Supreme Court upheld long arm jurisdiction because the defendant had
placed its product in the stream of commerce, and it was a reasonable infer-
ence that its products were sold in Illinois.
58. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
59. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
60. 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978).
61. 444 U.S. at 297.
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that Justice Black's two-step, transactional approach to personal
jurisdiction is still viable as an alternative competing theory. Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun argued that the focus on
the contacts between the forum and defendant was too narrow. 62
They would have found jurisdiction over the two local defendants
because the sale of new motor vehicles is a nationwide transaction
in which both were purposefully involved, and there had been no
showing that the defense of the litigation would be unfair or bur-
densome. These dissents alone show the persistence of the two-
step, transactional approach to long arm jurisdiction. That persis-
tence indicates that there may yet be more changes in the long
arm doctrine.
There is a second reason to expect more changes in long arm
doctrine. In World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice White sought to de-
fend his position by suggesting two reasons why the narrower, de-
fendant-oriented test was required:
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two
related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against
the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to
ensure that the States through their courts, do not reach out beyond the
limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal
system.6 3
The latter, interstate federalism argument, was given unusual
prominence, as if the Court simply could not permit the states to
employ the transactional test:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from be-
ing forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the fo-
rum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even
if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due
Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment.64
This emphasis on federalism was analyzed and strongly ques-
tioned by several commentators. 65 Very quickly Justice White
reached out in a later case to abandon any reliance on the federal-
ism argument.66 Justice White did not suggest that the actual
holding in World-Wide Volkswagen was wrong,67 but this partial
62. Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 313 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at
317 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. 444 U.S. at 291.
64. Id. at 294.
65. See Braveman, supra note 51; Lewis, supra note 51; Redish, supra note 51.
66. Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982).
67. Justice White commented on the federalism argument in this manner
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal
jurisdiction, as applied to state courts, reflects an element of federal-
ism and the character of state sovereignty vis-a-vis other States ....
Contrary to the suggestion of Justice Powell, [dissenting], our hold-
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abandonment of the most recent leading case suggests that the
doctrine of long arm jurisdiction will continue to change as the
Supreme Court tries to establish a stable doctrine.68
The primary concern left from World-Wide Volkswagen, after
federalism is removed, is not fairness of litigation but fairness of
choice of law. That is a concern that a nonresident defendant
brought into the forum under the long arm statute, although able
to litigate there, may want to avoid the substantive law of the fo-
rum because it is critically different on a key issue from the sub-
stantive law elsewhere. 69 Traditionally, the choice of what
substantive law to apply to a multi-state transaction has been a
conflicts question, and a defendant could be protected from an un-
fair application of the forum's substantive law through the conflicts
doctrine. However, now that seems unlikely to happen, since re-
cently the Supreme Court effectively removed most constitutional
ing today does not alter the requirement that there be "minimum
contacts" between the nonresident defendant and the forum State.
Rather, our holding deals with how the facts needed to show those
"minimum contacts" can be established when a defendant fails to
comply with court-ordered discovery. The restriction on state sover-
eign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however,
must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty pre-
served by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of
the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no
mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism con-
cept operated as an independent restriction on the sovereign power
of the court, it would not be possible to waive the personal jurisdic-
tion requirement: Individual actions cannot change the powers of
sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to powers
from which he may otherwise be protected.
Id. at 702 n.10 (1982). The main focus in the Insurance Corp. case was on the
use of an establishment order under FED. R. Crv. P. 37(b) (2) (A) to establish
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who had raised the defense of lack of
personal jurisdiction but who would not comply with discovery orders.
68. Justice Powell's dissent suggests that Justice White's footnote might have a
substantial effect on long arm jurisdiction:
Before today, of course, our cases had linked minimum contacts
and fair play as jointly defining the "sovereign" limits on state asser-
tions of personal jurisdiction over unconsenting defendants....
The Court appears to abandon the rationale of these cases in a foot-
note .... But it does not address the implications of its actions. By
eschewing reliance on the concept of minimum contacts as a "sover-
eign" limitation on the power of State-for, again, it is the State's
long-arm statute that is invoked to obtain personal jurisdiction in the
District Court-the Court today effects a potentially substantial
change of law. For the first time it defines fair play. And, astonish-
ingly to me, it does so in a case in which this rationale for decision
was neither argued nor briefed by the parties.
Id. at 714. See Lewis, supra note 51.
69. Lilly, supra note 51, at 107-111.
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limits on choice of law in such cases. 70 As a result, the Supreme
Court, in World-Wide Volkswagen, formulated a narrower long
arm jurisdiction test as an apparent partial solution to a potential
conflicts problem, even though it did not appear there was any ac-
tual conflicts problem in the case.7 1
The issue still remains framed as a choice between the one-step
defendant-oriented test and the two-step transaction-oriented test.
The reaffirmation of the defendant-oriented test in World-Wide
Volkswagen is unlikely to settle the issue for long, given the now
apparent weakness of a primary argument for it. A single factor
test does not accommodate multiple concerns very effectively, and
the focus in current doctrine on the defendant's purposeful affilia-
tion with the forum leaves little room to consider the relative con-
venience or fairness of the forum. If the Supreme Court does not
address the issue for several years, the historical pattern suggests
that many of the state supreme courts will continue the trend to-
ward expansion of long arm jurisdiction, especially in those cases
involving multiple parties resident in many different states.72 The
World-Wide Volkswagen test will be satisfied in form, even if bent
in substance, as was the Hanson v. Denckla test. If the Supreme
Court does address the issue soon, the strict defendant orientation
may be modified or even abandoned. It could then be replaced by
either the two-step transaction-oriented test or by a broader trans-
action test with a forum non conveniens doctrine to protect de-
fendants actually burdened unfairly by distant litigation. Until
there is further guidance from the United States Supreme Court,73
Nebraska courts will have some freedom to interpret the limits of
the new statute, guided by precedent from the other state and fed-
eral courts.
B. Nebraska Long Arm Jurisdiction
Nebraska adopted its first general long arm statute in 1967,74
70. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). See generally Hay, Full Faith
and Credit and Federalism in Choice of Law, 34 MERCER L REV. 709 (1983).
71. It appears that World-Wide Volkswagen was really a dispute about choice of
forum. The action was filed by a New York plaintiff in Oklahoma state court-
as long as the retailer and distributor were parties, the action was not remov-
able because they were also New Yorkers. If they had been dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction, the other two defendants could then remove to
federal court.
72. See Kennelly, Choice of Laws, Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens, 26
TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 260 (1982).
73. The Supreme Court did accept one recent case that would have provided fur-
ther guidance on long arm jurisdiction, but subsequently dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. Gillette Co. v. Miner, 102 S. Ct. 1767, cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct.
484 (1982).
74. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-535 to 25-541 (1979).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
substantially adopting the Uniform Interstate and International
Procedure Act. The key section established that long arm jurisdic-
tion could be exercised over a defendant who fit within one of six
categories, such as transacting business in the state or causing tor-
tious injury in the state.7 5 Although the statute, when adopted,
presented a clear list of the kinds of activity that would certainly
meet the due process test for long arm jurisdiction, it was not clear
that it exhaustively described the judicial power of the state. As a
result, there were interpretative questions as to the scope of the
statute, with one Nebraska Supreme Court opinion suggesting that
the section should be interpreted to show legislative intent to per-
mit the courts to assert as much long arm jurisdiction as permitted
by the due process clause,7 6 while another opinion by the same
author held that only the enumerated categories provided a basis
for long arm jurisdiction.77 The new Nebraska statute has elimi-
nated the interpretation questions, by providing that the courts
may exercise personal jurisdiction over any person "who has any
other contact with or maintains any other relation to this state to
afford a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent
with the Constitution of the United States." 78 This clearly estab-
lishes that the only limit on long arm jurisdiction is the due pro-
cess clause. It is somewhat duplicative to have both the original
75. Jurisdiction over a person. (1) A court may exercise personal juris-
diction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause
of action arising from the person's:
(a) Transacting any business in this state;
(b) Contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(c) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(d) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission
outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages
in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial reve-
nue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state;
(e) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in
this state; or
(f) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located
within this state at the time of contracting.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536 (1979).
76. Stucky v. Stucky, 186 Neb. 636, 185 N.W.2d 656 (1971).
77. Larimore v. Snyder, 206 Neb. 64, 291 N.W.2d 241 (1980). This decision should
not be considered as controlling under the amended statute. It held that
there was no long arm jurisdiction in a paternity case, because the act of fa-
thering a child in Nebraska was not enumerated in the statute. Now that the
statute has eliminated the need to fit within one of the enumerated categories
of § 25-536, the only issue is that of due process. Eight states have adopted
the Uniform Parentage Act § 8(b), 9A U.L.A. 598 (1979), which expressly es-
tablishes long arm jurisdiction in such paternity cases; this assertion of long
arm jurisdiction should be within the due process limits.
78. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536(2) (Supp. 1983). Among other state statutes with
similar language are CAi. CODE CIrv. P. § 410.10; IOwA R. Crv. P. § 56.2; R..
GEN. LAws § 9-5-33 (1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214(a) (6) (1980).
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six specific sections and the broad due process section, but that
duplication was done deliberately to emphasize the expansion of
long arm jurisdiction.
For many cases the reach of long arm jurisdiction is clear, as
some examples should demonstrate. Assume that a resident of
state A drives to Nebraska, collides with a Nebraska resident in
Nebraska, and then returns to state A. Long arm jurisdiction will
reach the resident of state A.79 Assume that a seller in state B
manufactures a product and sends it to a Nebraska retailer; after
the product is sold to a Nebraska resident it malfunctions and
causes personal injury to the Nebraska resident. Again long arm
jurisdiction will reach the seller in state B.80 Assume that a seller
in state C sends a sales representative to call on a buyer in Ne-
braska; after the buyer and sales representative sign a contract in
Nebraska for goods to be delivered in Nebraska, the seller
breaches the contract. Once again the long arm jurisdiction will
reach the seller in state C.81 In each case the action can be filed in
a Nebraska court, and a summons can be served outside the state,
wherever the defendant may be found.
Not all cases are so clearly within long arm jurisdiction, as some
other examples will illustrate. Assume that a doctor in neighbor-
ing state D treats a Nebraska resident at the doctor's office in state
D, and subsequently the Nebraska resident is hospitalized in Ne-
braska; complications ensue and the Nebraska resident wants to
sue both the Nebraska hospital and the state D doctor for medical
malpractice. Will long arm jurisdiction reach the doctor in state
D?82 Assume that a Nebraska resident contracts by telephone or
mail to sell goods to a buyer in state E, and sends the goods to the
buyer in state E but is never paid and wants to sue. Will long arm
jurisdiction reach the buyer in state E?83 Assume that a manufac-
79. This well-established use of long arm jurisdiction was upheld under an older
procedure in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
80. See Stoehr v. American Honda Motor Co., 429 F. Supp. 763 (D. Neb. 1977);
Hetrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 429 F. Supp. 116 (D. Neb. 1976); Blum
v. Kawaguchi, Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 216 (D. Neb. 1971).
81. Taubler v. Giraud, 655 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1981); General Leisure Products
Corp. v. Gleason Corp., 331 F. Supp. 278 (D. Neb. 1971).
82. Compare Lemke v. St. Margaret Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction), with Walters v. St. Elizabeth Hosp. Medical
Center, 543 F. Supp. 559 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (no personal jurisdiction), and
Glover v. Wagner, 462 F. Supp. 308 (D. Neb. 1978) (no jurisdiction).
83. Compare Electro Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Electronics Corp., 417 F.2d 365 (8th
Cir. 1969) (upholding jurisdiction), with Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Moun-
tain States Const. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907
(1980) (no jurisdiction). Justice Powell's dissent in Lakeside argued that
there was a substantial conflict among the federal and state courts that the
Supreme Court should resolve. 445 U.S. at 909-11.
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turer in state F sells its product to a retailer in state G, who sells
the product to a Nebraska resident; the Nebraska resident returns
to Nebraska with the product and is injured at home when the
product malfunctions. Will long arm jurisdiction reach both the
manufacturer in state F and the retailer in state G?84 Assume an
airline crash in Nebraska on a flight from state H to a Nebraska
city, in which the airline is from state I, the plane was manufac-
tured and sold in state J, the engine was from state K, the critical
part was from state L, and the part was repaired in state M. Will
long arm jurisdiction reach all five parties in states I, J, K, L and
M?85
A critical factor in determining whether the Nebraska judicial
power will reach far enough to sustain long arm jurisdiction in
each of these difficult cases will be whether the statute is inter-
preted expansively or narrowly. In making the choice necessitated
by the conflicting precedent and the weakness of current Supreme
Court doctrine, the most persuasive argument is that the Nebraska
statute should be interpreted expansively. The purpose should
not be to keep judicial business in Nebraska courts or to simply
favor Nebraska plaintiffs. Rather, an expansive interpretation of
long arm jurisdiction, if coupled with use of the forum non con-
veniens doctrine, will best ensure that Nebraska courts hear all
cases where it is most fair and efficient to try them in Nebraska.86
The Nebraska courts should remain concerned that the exer-
cise of jurisdiction be fair to both parties. A plaintiff has an inter-
est in finding a convenient forum where the defendant can be
required to defend. A defendant needs protection against being
forced to defend in a forum so distant that the burden of defending
destroys the ability to defend. In addition to fairness, the courts
should consider efficiency in litigation. Witnesses and evidence
may be more conveniently located for a trial in Nebraska than else-
where. In multiple party cases some parties may be subject to ju-
risdiction in Nebraska and therefore can be joined if the action is
here, but they may not be subject to jurisdiction in any other fo-
rum so it will be less efficient to deny jurisdiction and require two
lawsuits. All of these concerns can best be addressed if the Ne-
84. The Supreme Court implied a negative answer in World-Wide Volkswagen in
Justice White's parade of classic horrible examples of foreseeability as the
sole test. 444 U.S. at 296. On the other hand, the same opinion favorably cited
a case using the "stream of commerce" theory, which would uphold long arm
jurisdiction in such a situation. Id. at 298, (citing Gray v. American Radiator
and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961)). See also
State ex rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols Corp. v. Dale, 294 Or. 381, 657 P.2d 211
(1982).
85. See Kennelly, supra note 72, at 292-307.
86. See Redish, supra note 51, at 1133-44.
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braska courts are considered as part of a national legal system in
which a primary objective is providing a proper forum for every
litigated case, no matter how complicated or spread out.87
An important ingredient of the proposal for an expansive read-
ing of the long arm jurisdiction is the forum non conveniens doc-
trine, first clearly recognized in Nebraska in 1974.88 Under forum
non conveniens, Nebraska courts can decline to hear a case, even
though it is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and
even though the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction, if
Nebraska is an inconvenient forum. Jurisdiction is not to be de-
clined lightly, but forum non conveniens can apply if the conven-
ience of the parties and the public interest indicate that the case
should be tried elsewhere. Forum non conveniens permits a de-
fendant to show that a trial in Nebraska will be unfairly burden-
some, and thus tempers the reach of the long arm jurisdiction.
Forum non conveniens offers two advantages over a narrow in-
terpretation of long arm jurisdiction.89 Since forum non con-
veniens requires comparing the convenience of Nebraska and
some other jurisdiction, it necessarily assumes that there is some
other jurisdiction also able to hear the dispute. A narrow interpre-
tation of the long arm jurisdiction could sometimes leave a plaintiff
with no alternative forum where all parties could be joined. In ad-
dition, forum non conveniens does not require that the action in
Nebraska be dismissed outright; the dismissal can be conditional
on some action by the defendant or the action can be stayed pend-
ing litigation elsewhere.9 0 In contrast, a lack of personal jurisdic-
tion can only lead to dismissal of the action against the defendant.
Thus, forum non conveniens permits better evaluation of the fair-
ness and efficiency of hearing a particular case in Nebraska.
World-Wide Volkswagen may have reaffirmed that fairness and ef-
ficiency are not the only concerns, but not even Justice V'rhite's
language can make them completely irrelevant.
In each of the difficult cases set out in the examples,91 there will
often be additional facts that create sufficient contact with Ne-
braska to support long arm jurisdiction. The doctor in the neigh-
boring state may have shown a willingness and interest in serving
Nebraska residents, whether by telephone listings in Nebraska di-
rectories or accepting referrals from Nebraska doctors. The buyer
may have first approached the Nebraska resident, or otherwise
87. See Hazard, Interstate Venue, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 711 (1979).
88. Qualley v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 191 Neb. 787, 217 N.W.2d 914 (1974).
89. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFICTS § 84 (1971); Piper Air-
craft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
90. See, e.g., MacLeod v. MacLeod, 383 A.2d 39 (Me. 1978).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
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taken steps to establish contact with the state. A manufacturer
selling to a retailer in a neighboring state may also sell directly to
Nebraska retailers, or may directly advertise in Nebraska, or may
know and approve of the retailer's cultivation of the Nebraska mar-
ket. Similarly, the retailer in the neighboring state may have made
some efforts to cultivate the Nebraska market. In the airline crash
case, each of the parties may have shown a willingness to become
involved in a national distribution of its particular product. In each
case, the plaintiff will have the burden of finding and demonstrat-
ing the additional facts that show a defendant's direct or indirect
attempts to benefit from Nebraska, in order to fit within the "pur-
posefully avails" test of World-Wide Volkswagen and Hanson v.
Denckla.92
C. Obsolete Theory
The century of change in the law of personal jurisdiction saw
the development of other theories before reaching modern long
arm doctrine. Among the theories were quasi in rem jurisdiction
and the statutory agent upon whom service could be made. The
demise of these theories should be noted by Nebraska practition-
ers, as the limited scope of each theory has been encompassed by
the overall reach of the long arm doctrine.
Quasi in rem jurisdiction had offered a plaintiff a procedure for
obtaining jurisdiction over an absent defendant who had property
in the forum; by attaching the property at the start of the litigation
over an unrelated cause of action, the plaintiff acquired jurisdic-
tion to the amount of the property.93 Before there was any long
arm jurisdiction, quasi in rem jurisdiction sometimes accom-
plished the same purpose, even if it was fortuitous in some cases
that the defendant had property in the forum. The advantage of
quasi in rem jurisdiction effectively disappeared in 1977 when the
Supreme Court, in Shaffer v. Heitner,94 held that all assertions of
jurisdiction, including the quasi in rem jurisdiction asserted there,
had to meet the due process test of International Shoe.9 5 In 1980,
an amendment to the attachment statute eliminated any jurisdic-
tional ground for attachment in Nebraska, thus ending the use of
quasi in rem jurisdiction. 96 However, given a broad long arm stat-
ute, a plaintiff can reach a defendant as effectively directly as
92. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
93. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICTS § 79 (1971).
94. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
95. Id.
96. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1001 (Supp. 1982).
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through a quasi in rem attachment.97
The statutory agent was a product of the movement toward
modern long arm statutes. Corporations and out-of-state motorists
were early targets for long arm statutes. The first step was a re-
quirement that such potential defendants actually appoint an
agent in the state upon whom service could be made. 98 The second
step was a statute providing that certain activity in the state, such
as driving a motor vehicle,99 or doing business,100 was an automatic
appointment of a state official as an agent of the potential defend-
ant upon whom service could be made. The Supreme Court up-
held such involuntary appointments, if the statute required the
state official to take action to actually notify the out-of-state de-
fendant.10 1 Such statutes were valuable when first adopted, be-
cause they provided a procedure for reaching an out-of-state
defendant while maintaining the fiction that the summons was not
being sent across the state line. Once such statutes removed the
novelty of reaching across state lines, and laid the foundation for
modern long arm doctrine, the need for the statutes disappeared.
Even though such statutes are inefficient, requiring a two-step pro-
cedure to notify a defendant when direct notice will suffice, 10 2 they
persist, and even worse, have been adopted in recent statutes
where not at all needed.103 The new Nebraska statute has ended
the era of the statutory agent,10 4 because any defendant with suffi-
cient contacts with the state can be reached directly under the
long arm statute. However, since the United States Supreme
Court has at times commented on whether there was any special
state interest in a specific long arm jurisdiction,105 in many stat-
utes only the statutory agent language was repealed while the
97. There was an effort in some states to use quasi in rem attachment of an insur-
ance policy beyond the limits of long arm jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court
held that such an approach violated the due process clause. Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320 (1980).
98. See, e.g., Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
99. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
100. See, e.g., Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
101. Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
102. Sometimes the two-step procedure produces a misstep and ineffective serv-
ice. See, e.g., Lydick v. Smith, 201 Neb. 45, 266 N.W.2d 208 (1978).
103. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-2856 (1981) (enacted in 1977); id. § 81-1930 (1981)
(enacted in 1980).
104. Over three dozen such statutes were repealed by the 1983 statute. The only
survivor, NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-175.01 (1978), was not repealed only because of
opposition from the Workmen's Compensation Court. However, this section
does not extend the jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Court any
further than is possible directly under the long arm statute.
105. E.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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statement of the legislature's special interest was retained. 0 6
III. Nebraska Procedure Changes
A. Challenges to Personal Jurisdiction
A defendant may want to challenge the personal jurisdiction of
the court either on the ground that the summons was not properly
served or on the ground that the defendant is outside the state and
not subject to long arm jurisdiction. In Nebraska, this challenge
has always been by a special appearance, a nonstatutory proce-
dure developed solely by case law. 0 7 The new statute provides a
statutory basis for the special appearance and establishes some
clear rules about the procedure. 0 8 The special appearance must
still be made before any other pleading or motion is filed; the stat-
ute continues this requirement because any other filing would be a
general appearance which would moot the issue of personal juris-
diction. Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and many
states following that model, the Nebraska statute does not author-
ize any additional objections in the special appearance.10 9 De-
fenses such as lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue,
improper joinder, or failure to state a cause of action will have to
be raised in a later filing."10
The new statute also answers the persistent question about
what a defendant can do if the special appearance is overruled by
the trial court-Can the special appearance be preserved through
a trial on the merits in order to obtain appellate review of the trial
judge's ruling?"' In most cases the statute gives the defendant a
clear choice between either continuing with a trial on the merits
and waiving the personal jurisdiction defense or appealing the per-
sonal jurisdiction ruling only after defaulting on the merits. If the
personal jurisdiction defense relates to the manner or method of
service, any further participation by the defendant in the trial
106. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-137.02 (Supp. 1983) (Unauthorized Insurers Process
Act); id. § 44-1801 (1978) (Unauthorized Insurers False Advertising Process
Act).
107. Crowell v. Galloway, 3 Neb. 215 (1874).
108. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-516.01 (Supp. 1983).
109. Cf., e.g., FED. R. CIrv. P. 12(g). Prior case law also required that only the objec-
tion to personal jurisdiction be raised in the special appearance. Clark v.
Bankers Accident Ins. Co., 96 Neb. 381, 147 N.W. 1118 (1914).
110. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-806, 25-808 (1979).
111. The defendant did so in Mindt v. Shavers, 214 Neb. 786, - N.W.2d - (1983),
but most defendants in recent decades found they had somehow waived the
issue by a misstep in the trial court. See, e.g., Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187
Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971). Under the new statute, the defendant in
Mindt v. Shavers would waive any claim of error in overruling his special
appearance by participating in the trial on the merits.
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court, as by defending on the merits, waives the objection. Such
objections, such as whether the person with whom the summons
was left was of "suitable discretion," can well be determined by
the trial judge without the need for Supreme Court review; it
would certainly be inefficient to reverse the trial court on such an
issue after a full trial on the merits. A defendant could still obtain
Supreme Court review by defaulting on the merits and appealing
only the personal jurisdiction issue, but that is less likely.112 On
the other hand, if the issue is amenability to process rather than
the method of service, the issue can be preserved for appeal after a
trial on the merits, if the defendant only defends and does not seek
affirmative relief. This will typically be a defendant served outside
Nebraska; the issue of whether the defendant can be reached
under the Nebraska long arm statute is sufficiently important to
permit the clear guidance to all trial courts that can be provided by
review in the Supreme Court. There is always some risk that a
trial on the merits will be wasted if the Supreme Court finally finds
there was no long arm jurisdiction, but that should not happen
very often. The only alternative would be to permit immediate in-
terlocutory appeal of the jurisdictional issue, but that would open
an avenue for delay in too many cases.
All objections, whether to the method or manner of service, or
to amenability to service, are waived by the filing of the counter-
claim, cross-claim or third-party claim. All such claims for affirma-
tive relief are at the option of the defendant, since there is no
compulsory counterclaim rule."13 It is generally accepted that a
defendant should not be permitted to both deny the court's juris-
diction and at the same time ask the court to exercise the jurisdic-
tion to benefit the defendant."14 The nonresident defendant can
fully defend on the merits without waiving the objection to the
reach of the long arm jurisdiction, because only the three stated
claims waive the objection. Therefore, the objection to the trial
court's ruling on the special appearance is not waived by such pro-
cedures as a motion to compel discovery, a motion for discovery
sanctions, or a motion for summary judgment, as each procedure is
part of the defense of the action.
The special appearance statute is an attempt to focus on sub-
stance and not form. It is not words, but carefully defined action
that results in a waiver of the personal jurisdiction objection. An
112. Cases from jurisdictions with similar provisions are collected at Annot., 62
A.L.R.2d 937, 950-53 (1957).
113. The only sanction for omitting a counterclaim is denial of costs in any subse-
quent action. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-814 (1979).
114. This rule is followed by the federal courts as well, at least for the permissive
claims. C. WRmIHT & A. MI.LER, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1397 (1969).
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attempt to preserve the objection by restating it will be of no effect
if the defendant asserts an affirmative claim or defends on the mer-
its. On the other hand, the nonresident defendant objecting to
long arm jurisdiction does not need to preserve the objection by
repeating it in every pleading, motion and other paper as such boil-
erplate form accomplishes nothing." 5
B. The State of Nebraska as a Party
The new statute has substantially simplified the method of
serving process on the State of Nebraska and state agencies, but
the improved procedure could be misleading. The statute provides
that all service on the state, state agencies, and state employees,
sued in an official capacity, shall be made by serving the Attorney
General." 6 This effectively makes the Attorney General the agent
for service, and eliminates any need to serve the Governor, the
state agency, or the state employee. However, this does not make
the Attorney General a party to the action, and the Attorney Gen-
eral does not have to be a party to the action or counsel to the
party for whom served; it only centralizes the service of process in
one place.
The new statute has only changed the method of service; it has
not changed the definition of the proper parties to any action." 7 At
present, there are many differing procedures for appealing from
agency action or otherwise obtaining judicial review." 8 If a neces-
sary party is the head of an agency in an official capacity, that per-
son must be named as a party even though service on that person
will be made by service on the Attorney General." 9 If the em-
ployee is named in a personal capacity, as in an action for damages
115. The new statute was not intended to encourage defendants to file special ap-
pearances. If anything, the special appearance is overused as a tactic for de-
lay. In addition, the new statute should not be considered the final word on
the subject, as there are substantial arguments supporting adoption of a re-
quirement that all matters in abatement be made in a single motion, such as
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. The wisdom of that approach
should be independently considered by the bar committee examining the
pleading statutes. Section 25-516.01 was only intended to provide clear an-
swers to the specific issues addressed.
116. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-510.02(1) (Supp. 1983).
117. See, e.g., Leach v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 213 Neb. 103, 327 N.W.2d 615
(1982) (Director of Department of Motor Vehicles is necessary party in ap-
peal of driver's license revocation).
118. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1901 to 1908 (1979) (petition in error); id., § 84-
917 (1981) (review of action of administrative agency by appeal to district
court). A comprehensive modification of the administrative appeal statutes
should be introduced during the 1984 session of the Unicameral.
119. If more than one agency or employee is a named party, only one summons
needs to be served on the Attorney General.
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under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the employee must be served as an
individual. If the employee is named in both a personal and indi-
vidual capacity, both the Attorney General and the employee must
be served.
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of personal jurisdiction doctrine and the rules gov-
erning service of process makes clear that the doctrine and rules
will continue to change. The requirements and limits of the due
process clause, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court, do not remain static. The practical problem always remains
the same as the courts try to fashion a method of service that is
both effective and inexpensive, while providing clear guidance to
the process server in completing the necessary task of delivering
papers unwanted by many of those served. The new Nebraska
statute clarifies some previously existing ambiguities and provides
a coherent base upon which future improvements can be made.
